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Substantial Assistance and Sentence Severity:
Is There a Correlation?
ow much more severe are sentences
imposed in districts with low substantial
assistance rates than those in which the rate
is very high? In the aggregate, not at all.
At first blush this may puzzle readers because
substantial assistance (SA) departures are very
unevenly distributed across districts and SA
accounts for nearly two-thirds of all downward
departures, almost 7,900 of the 12,000 in fiscal
1996.' Although this pattern could result in gross
disparities among districts, my analysis of inter-
district sentencing patterns reveals no statistically
significant correlation between the rate of SA
departures and the average length of sentences
imposed in a district.
A high rate of SA does not mean that sentences
are generally more lenient because SA departures
are only one factor in the complex system that
determines sentence severity. SA departures are
among the most visible mechanisms, but their
impact is typically blunted by district-specific prac-
tices in which prosecutors and judges respond to
each other's choices in ways that even out inter-
district differences and mitigate the disparities that
might otherwise result from wide variation in SA
departures.'
I. Disparity
Substantial assistance departures vary greatly among
districts. There is an almost fivefold difference in
cooperation rates between the ten highest and ten
lowest districts. The average cooperation rate for the
ten lowest districts is 7.1%.3 The average cooperation
rate for the ten highest districts is 38.I%.4 Defen-
dants in the io lowest SA districts had about one-fifth
the chance of receiving a substantial assistance down-
ward departure at the time of sentence5 compared to
defendants 6 in the io highest SA districts. There are
also 37 districts in the middle, whose rates fall in a
band between 15% and 25%.
Despite these variations, Commission statistics
for all 94 districts in FY 1996 show no significant
correlation between a district's substantial assistance
rate and the average lengths of all sentences of
imprisonment or the average lengths of narcotics
trafficking sentences in a given district. 7 Analysis of
the fifteen highest and lowest SA districts does not
change the pattern. Even within those groups, very
high and very low SA rates did not correlate with
sentence lengths.
II. Comparing Neighboring Districts
A comparison of contiguous districts illustrates the
varied combinations of high or low SA rates and
lenient or severe sentences. The First Circuit, for
example, had an overall SA rate equal to the national
average, 19.2%. Within the circuit, the District of
New Hampshire had an SA departure rate of 43%
(63 of 45 total cases) while its neighbor Maine, with
the same number of prosecutions, had a rate of
19.3% (28 out of i45 cases).8 Despite its higher SA
rate, the mean drug sentence for New Hampshire
was 61.2 months compared to a mean of 47.9 months
in Maine.
The District of Massachusetts departed for SA in
25.6% of cases (115 out of 45o) while neighboring
Rhode Island departed in 4.6% of cases (5 out of io8).
For this pair, the district with the lower SA departure
rate did have a longer mean narcotics sentence:
Rhode Island's mean was 76.5 months, Massachusetts
was 64.2 months.9
The District of Connecticut had an overall SA
rate of io.9%, including a SA rate of 19.2% for
narcotics trafficking (15 out of 78 cases). Neighboring
Vermont had an overall SA departure rate of 25.8%,
including a SA rate of 45.5% in narcotics cases (i 5 out
of 33 cases). Again, the lower rate went with the
longer sentence. Connecticut's SA rate is higher
than Rhode Island's, yet its mean sentence is much
longer, 104.8 months.
The First Circuit thus contains combinations of
SA rates and sentence lengths that are very disparate
III. Comparing Same-State Districts
Districts within the same state also show significant
variations. The Northern District of Mississippi had an
overall SA rate of29.4% (45 out of i3 cases) with half
the narcotics defendants receiving SA departures (30
out of 6o cases). The Southern District of Mississippi
had an overall rate of16.3%. In this district, 36.6% of
the narcotics trafficking defendants received SA
departures (26 out of 7Icases), but those 26 were
almost 8o% of all the departures (26 out of 33 cases).
Despite these differences, the mean narcotics
trafficking sentence was nearly the same: in the
Southern District of Mississippi the mean was 101.7
months, while in the Northern District it was 104.6
months.
Illinois has three districts, ranging from a low of
13.4% for the Southern District, to 18.8% for the
Northern District, to a high of 32.7% for the Central
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District. In this trio, the district with the lowest SA
rate had the middle length narcotics trafficking
sentence. The Southern District reported a mean
narcotics sentence of 1O9.5 months, the high SA rate
Central District was not far behind with a mean of 98
months, and the Northern District, with its 18.8% SA
departures, reported a mean sentence of 119.7
months.
Variations are also found in the West. In
Washington, the Eastern District had a substantial
assistance departure rate of 4.5% (9 out of 202 cases),
while the Western District had a rate of 22% (97 out
of 440 cases), but their mean narcotics sentence
lengths were almost identical. The Eastern District
had 68.3 months and the Western District had 68.4
months.
In these three sets of same-state districts, the SA
rates varied considerably but average sentence lengths
fell within a narrow range. All these districts could be
compared in other ways but they illustrate that quite
different combinations of high or low SA rates and
relatively severe or lenient sentences can be found in
contiguous districts.
IV. Alternative Ways to Mitigate Sentences
Several different mechanisms permit sentence
severity to remain independent of the single most
common mitigating guideline factor. Perhaps the
easiest mechanism to identify in these data is the
nationwide tendency of districts to mitigate sentences
with either SA departures or other downward judicial
departures (judicial departures), but not both.' When
judges are generous with mitigation through judicial
departures, prosecutors scale back; when prosecutors
are free with SA departures, judges make less use of
the discretion to mitigate by using factors other than
SA."I This pattern mitigates some of the sentencing
disparity that would otherwise flow from wide
variations in SA rates because judges seem to be
balancing prosecutorial use of SA departures with
judicial departures.
Comparison of SA downward departures and
judicial departures also illustrates the complexity of
the system. Unlike SA departures, rates of judicial
departures do correlate with lower overall sentences
and lower narcotics sentences." The use of judicial
departures probably correlates with sentence severity
because other downward departures are often not the
subject of bargaining between the defendant and the
prosecutor, leaving judges with much greater control.
When the award and magnitude of a departure is
entirely up to the judge, whose intentions remain
unknown until the prosecutor has made all of his or
her charging and sentencing decisions, the mitigation
"goes right to the bottom line" in the sense that it
reduces the sentence without any opportunity for
responsive moves by the prosecutor. Thus, judicial
departures are more likely to represent a judicial
judgment that sentence mitigation is warranted in a
given case, rather than a judgment that a particular
sentence is warfanted because of the prosecutor's SA
motion or charging decision.
Judicial sentencing attitudes play out in a more
complicated fashion in the arena of SA downward
departures. Clearly a judge's own views play the key
role in those cooperation sentences where the
magnitude of the departure is completely in the
judge's discretion. 3 But because SA downward
departures are always the result of bargaining
between the defendant and the prosecutor, the
magnitude of SA departures can be limited. For
instance, prosecutors may agree to move for a
departure below the applicable guideline range but not
below the mandatory minimum. 4 Defendants who
receive departures in some high SA districts may find
the benefit lower than average because the govern-
ment chooses to tie its generous SA departure policy
with less generous recommendations as to the
magnitude of the SA departure. 5
Controlling the magnitude of departures granted
by judges, however, is the more visible but probably
the smaller part of the process that tends to even out
the sentence impact of inter-district variations in SA
departure rates. Other exercises of prosecutorial
discretion, besides those addressing the length of the
SA departure, are also likely to be important in
explaining why SA rates do not predict sentence
lengths. The data analyzed here, however, offer little
empirical insight into that area, although the mecha-
nisms available to prosecutors are well known.
Prosecutors can offer a lenient plea bargain, manipu-
late the sentence calculations through sentence factor
bargaining,'6 omit relevant conduct, or agree not to
oppose a defendant's motion for a judicial downward
departure.
Each district reaches its own equilibrium in the
use of these devices, influenced by the attitudes of
and interactions between the bench and U.S.
Attorney's Office, and by each district's historical
sentencing patterns.' 7 Although the interplay is
different in each district, the overall effect is to blunt
the impact of differences in SA rates.
The fact that inter-district and nationwide
statistics suggest that district to district variations do
not result in broad sentence disparities does not
address the very real individual inequalities that can
arise in particular cases. The impact of an SA
departure upon an individual defendant's sentence
can be dramatic. The average difference between
cooperation and non-cooperation sentences in
narcotics trafficking cases is more than five years and
as the guideline sentences grow, so do the reduc-
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tions.5 Not every defendant, however, who fails to
receive a SA departure ends up with a harsher
sentence than those who do. The actual sentence
imposed depends on a number of prosecutorial and
judicial decisions. While the guidelines constrain the
choices available, there remain enough different ways
to combine those choices and so influence the
ultimate sentence that responsibility for sentencing
remains with the people making decisions, rather
than with the guideline system itself.
Finally, it bears noting that the Commission's
statistics and the guidelines themselves make SA
departures more readily identifiable targets for claims
of disparity than some other causes. The number of
departures is easily reported and discussed. Less
visible are other common tools used to influence
sentence length, including charging decisions,
sentence factor manipulation, prosecutorial sentence
recommendations and judicial adjustment of the
magnitude of departures. While these are harder to
capture and quantify, they are usually just as effective
in controlling sentence length as the now ubiquitous
but perhaps surprisingly under-determinative 5Ki
motion.
Notes
'Sentencing statistics for fiscal year 1996 can be found in UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS (1997). More detailed district data can be
found in UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS, Federal Sentencing Statistics by State, 1996 Fiscal
Year, Sentencing Commission home page at <http//
www.ussc.gov>, index to statistical files at <http//www.ussc.gov/
judpack/jp1996.htm>, complete set on file and CD with author.
All statistics in this article are from those two sources.
2This argument and the statistical analysis which follows are explored
in greater detail in Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for
Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
3There were 4036 total sentences in those districts and 297 total
substantial assistance departures cases in those districts.
'Actually, districts ranked 84 to 93; I excluded the Northern Mariana
Islands, the district with the highest rate of cooperation in the
nation, because its rate of 85% for 14 cases is completely
atypical. There were 3803 cases and 1485 SA departures in
those districts.
The Commission's statistics probably understate the real use of SA
departures. For example, the fifth lowest reported rate of
cooperation is in the E.D. Va. Apparently most cooperation in that
district is rewarded with a sentence reduction pursuant to FED. R.
CRIM. P 35(c) which permits the government to request a post-
sentence reduction for post-sentence cooperation. Although
judges in that district will not postpone sentences to permit
cooperation to mature, they seem to ignore the requirement that
35(c) reductions account only for post-sentence cooperation.
Commission statistics do not include such reductions. If the E.D.
Va. were excluded as anomalous (although the practice could be
common) and the 11th district (W.D. Ar.) were included, the rate is
7.5% (205 our of 3351 cases).
6Those districts account for 9.3% of all sentences (3806 out of
40,879 total sentences imposed).
7The only significant correlation was that both the mean and median
for fraud sentences increased as SA increased. This and other
district wide sentencing numbers compare district wide results and
do not reveal information about the actual distribution of individual
sentences in the district. I am grateful to Greg Drevenstedt, M.A.,
a doctoral candidate in demography and sociology at the
University of Pennsylvania, for his work on the analysis of
sentencing statistics discussed here.
81n New Hampshire, 53.5% of narcotics defendants received
departures (46 out of 86) compared to 33.3% (21 out of 63) in
Maine.
9The overall SA rate was 25.6%, with a rate of 37.5% in narcotics
trafficking cases (63 out of 168 cases), and an average
imprisonment length for narcotics trafficking cases below the
averages. The mean sentence length was 64.2 months, compared
with a national mean of 86.7 months and the median was 44.5
months, compared with the national median of 60 months. Rhode
Island's SA rate of 4.6% includes a rate of 3.9% in narcotics
trafficking cases (2 out of 51 cases). The mean sentence length
of 76.5 months was closer to, but still below the national mean of
86.7 months and its median sentence length was 60 months, equal
to the national median.
1°The analysis done for this study shows a statistically significant
negative correlation (r = -0.27 (p<O.O 1)) between SA and other
downward departures. This means that a lower rate of SAwill
predict a higher rate of other downward departures, and vice
versa.
"Anecdotal support is offered in Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate
Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two
Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 629 (1998) (in-depth comparison
of the districts of Massachusetts and Connecticut, noting that
Connecticut prosecutors used SA departures less because their
judges departed more for other reasons.
12The analysis for this study shows a statistically significant
correlation between the rate of judicial departures and the mean
for all sentences (r= 0.34 (p<O.01)), the median for all sentences
(r= 0.25 (p<O.05)), the mean for all narcotics trafficking sentences
and the median for all narcotics trafficking sentences (r= 0.33
(p<0.01)).
i3Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing
Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027, 1045 (1997) (District Judge, D. Mass
comments on failure to control the magnitude of departures).
"
4Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120 (1996) (holding that a
government motion to depart from the guidelines does not confer
authority upon the court to ignore the mandatory minimum; a
separate government motion pursuant to § 3553(e) is required).15See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 114 F3d 652 (7 th Cir. 1997)
(government recommended three level downward departure for
cooperation but the judge departed only one level); United States
v. Jimenez, 992 E2d 13 (7 th Cir. 1993) (agreement specified that
the government would recommend a 25% departure); see generally
Saris, supra note 15, at 1046-49 (variations in prosecutorial and
judicial practices determine magnitude of departures). Because
this analysis looks only at overall rates, not individual sentences
within each district, it is possible that high SA districts achieve the
same average sentence through a distribution of very high and very
low sentences, while low SA districts have more sentences in the
middle.
16See, e.g., U.S. v. Gonzalez-Bello, 1998 WL 352941, 11 Fed. Sent.
R. 30 (EDNY 1998) (discussing sentence factor bargaining over
guideline level adjustments).
"
7 Michael Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 299, 361 (1996) (finding that districts that were relatively
lenient before the guidelines remain relatively lenient).
18
SENT. COMM. SUEST. Ass. STAFF STUDY, discussed in 11 FED. SENT. R,
no. 1.
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